Through mental simulation humans can transcend the present to recall the past, imagine the future, and consider alternative realities. Further, this ability supports a wide range of human capacities (e.g., action representation: Jeannerod, 2001 ; memory and prediction: Schacter & Addis, 2007 ; judgment and decision making: Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; coping: Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998) . A common feature of mental simulations is mental imagery (Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009 ). The present experiments investigate how an inherent feature of this imagery, its visual perspective, influences the basis for people's judgments about potential future events in their lives-specifically, the extent to which those judgments reflect associative evaluations of the simulated environment and propositional self-beliefs about relevant preferences and values.
Associative evaluations and propositional self-beliefs reflect two distinct forms of self-knowledge (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2012) that are not necessarily consistent (Nosek, 2005) . Thus, for example, people who believe themselves to be egalitarian may experience negative associations in response to an outgroup member. Typically, associative evaluations and propositional self-beliefs both contribute to actions and experiences as events unfold in real time (e.g., Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; McConnell, Dunn, Austin, & Rawn, 2011) ; however, reliance on each influence can be manipulated, and the extent to which each guides processing can significantly impact downstream judgment, emotion, and behavior (e.g., Gawronski & LeBel, 2008; Koole, Govorun, Cheng, & Gallucci, 2009; Wilson et al., 1993) . The present experiments test how an inherent feature of event imagery shapes reliance on each influence as people mentally simulate events.
Event images are necessarily defined by a visual perspective. An intriguing fact is that these images can vary in visual perspective: People may use their own first-person perspective or an external third-person perspective (Nigro & Neisser, 1983) . We hypothesized that the two perspectives differentially influence the basis for judgments as people mentally simulate events using imagery. Specifically, first-person imagery facilitates reliance on associative evaluations of the simulated environment, while third-person imagery facilitates reliance on propositional self-beliefs. These hypotheses follow from a model in which first-person imagery leads people to understand personal events bottom-up, based on the phenomenology evoked by concrete features of the pictured environment, and third-person imagery leads people to understand personal events top-down, in terms of abstractions that integrate the pictured event with broader propositional beliefs regarding their personal identities (e.g., traits, preferences, values).
Previous work has provided evidence consistent with the hypothesis that third-person (vs. first-person) imagery facilitates reliance on propositional self-beliefs-specifically, regarding self-esteem (Libby, Valenti, Pfent, & Eibach, 2011 ) and self-change over time (Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005) . The present experiments test how visual perspective affects reliance on propositional self-beliefs that define other elements of personal identity-preferences and values-thus seeking converging evidence for our hypothesized function of thirdperson imagery. The present experiments also seek evidence for the novel hypothesis that first-person (vs. third-person) imagery facilitates reliance on associative evaluations of the simulated environment and that this effect is independent of how perspective affects reliance on propositional self-beliefs.
The present experiments test our hypotheses in the context of behavioral and affective forecasting. When people contemplate a potential future event, they may wonder what they will do or how they will feel if it occurs. Mental simulation offers a method for answering these questions (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007) . In two experiments we manipulated the visual perspective participants used to mentally simulate a potential future event (voting, interracial interaction) and asked them to forecast their behavior or feelings if that event occurred.
To investigate the extent to which these forecasts reflected propositional self-beliefs and associative evaluations of the simulated environment, we collected indices of these factors in a separate session. We used the personalized implicit association test (pIAT; Olson & Fazio, 2004) to index associative evaluations of focal elements in the simulated environment (political candidates, outgroup members). This measure is sensitive to the personal associations stimuli evoke upon actual encounter while minimizing the influence of relevant propositional self-beliefs (Olson & Fazio, 2004) . To index participants' relevant propositional selfbeliefs we used explicit measures of personal preferences or values that were pertinent to the simulated event. Such explicit selfreports are sensitive to (even if not purely reflecting) propositional beliefs about personal preferences and values (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2012) .
We predicted that forecasts would more closely correspond with pIAT scores when participants used first-person rather than thirdperson imagery but would more closely correspond with explicit preferences and values when participants used third-person rather than first-person imagery.
Experiment 1: Forecasting Candidate Choice

Method
Participants. In the month before the 2008 U.S. presidential election, 161 undergraduates participated for course credit. Analyses excluded participants who had already voted (n ϭ 21), did not comply with online questionnaire instructions (n ϭ 3), erred on pIAT trials at a rate greater than three standard deviations from the sample mean (n ϭ 5), or failed perspective-manipulation checks (n ϭ 3), leaving 129 participants (91 females; 66 first-person).
Materials and procedure. Associative evaluations of candidates. During a lab session, participants completed a candidate pIAT (Olson & Fazio, 2004) that measured their relative ease categorizing photographs of the two candidates (Barack Obama, John McCain) together with personally liked versus disliked attitude object words (e.g., coffee, jogging). The set of photographs consisted of four of each candidate, matched for facial expression, orientation, and composition.
We used a D-score algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) to compute pIAT scores that capture the extent to which participants found it easier to categorize Obama with liked objects and McCain with disliked objects than vice versa (i.e., positive scores reflect an implicit preference for Obama; M ϭ 0.08, SD ϭ 0.67).
Propositional beliefs about personal preferences. During an online session, participants used 7-point bipolar scales (counterbalanced) to explicitly evaluate each candidate on seven dimensions (e.g., prepared/unprepared to be President, patriotic/unpatriotic, trustworthy/deceitful, moral/immoral, caring/cold, intelligent/unintelligent, able/unable Perspective manipulation and forecasting measure. In another online session participants were told they would be asked to visually imagine engaging in an action and either were instructed to use the first-person or third-person perspective (Libby, Shaeffer, Eibach, & Slemmer, 2007) : For the first manipulation check, participants clicked "yes" or "no" to indicate whether they understood the instructions.
Next, participants closed their eyes and used the specified perspective to picture themselves "voting in the upcoming presidential election," then opened their eyes and responded to the second manipulation check, assessing whether their image matched the perspective instruction.
Participants held their image in mind while completing a questionnaire including the dependent measure: "If you were to actually vote in the upcoming election, which candidate would you be more likely to vote for?" Participants responded on a fully labeled 7-point scale ranging from definitely McCain (-3) to definitely Obama (3; counterbalanced).
Results
Linear regression predicted participants' forecasted choice from pIAT scores and explicit preferences (sample-mean-centered), as well as perspective (-1 ϭ first-person, 1 ϭ third-person) and its interactions with the other two measures. Figure 1 plots the interactions.
As hypothesized, perspective moderated the role of associative evaluations in shaping forecasts (b ϭ Ϫ0.36, ␤ ϭ -.11, t(123) ϭ 2.01, p Ͻ .05): Forecasts corresponded with pIAT scores more when participants used the first-person perspective (b ϭ 0.99, ␤ ϭ .29, t(123) ϭ 4.01, p Ͻ .0001) than the third-person (b ϭ 0.26, ␤ ϭ .08, t(123) ϭ 1.00, p ϭ .32). And, perspective had the opposite effect in moderating the role of propositional beliefs about personal preferences (b ϭ 0.14, ␤ ϭ .12, t(123) ϭ 2.24, p Ͻ 
Experiment 2: Forecasting Interracial Anxiety
Experiment 2 sought to extend the hypothesized patterns to the domain of affective forecasting. Anxiety is a key factor shaping the quality and outcome of interracial interactions (Plant & Devine, 2003; Stephan & Stephan, 1985) . Previous work has suggested that more positive associative evaluations of an outgroup interaction partner's race are associated with experiencing less anxiety in interracial interactions (Richeson & Trawalter, 2005) , as is considering nonprejudiced responding to be central to one's personal values (Plant, 2004) . We predicted that when individuals imagined an interracial interaction, the extent to which their forecasted anxiety reflected these two bases would depend on perspective, conceptually replicating the Experiment 1 patterns. Specifically, picturing the interaction from the first-person as opposed to thirdperson perspective should cause forecasted anxiety to correspond more with associative evaluations of partner race and less with propositional beliefs regarding one's own nonprejudiced values.
Method
Participants. Ninety-six non-Black undergraduates participated for course credit. Analyses excluded participants who did not comply with online questionnaire instructions (n ϭ 2), erred on pIAT trials at a rate greater than three standard deviations from the sample mean (n ϭ 3), or failed perspective manipulation checks (n ϭ 1), leaving 90 participants (61 females; 43 first-person).
Materials and procedure. Associative evaluations of partner race. In a lab session, participants completed a Black/White race pIAT of the same format as in Experiment 1. The only differences were in the photograph stimuli and category labels ("African-American" and "European-American"). The photographs were from a sample IAT in DirectRT (Jarvis, 2006) and consisted of four photographs of faces of each race, matched for sex, facial expression, orientation, and composition. pIAT scores were computed using the method from Experiment 1 (M ϭ Ϫ0.13, SD ϭ 0.51), with positive scores reflecting pro-Black implicit preference.
Propositional beliefs about personal values. Measuring explicit beliefs about personal values in the domain of race is challenging because self-reports can reflect not only beliefs about one's own personal values but also about values held by others and their evaluation of the self (Plant & Devine, 1998) . To isolate the effect of beliefs about personal values and its hypothesized interaction with perspective, Experiment 2 administered the internal and external motivation to control prejudice scales (Plant & Devine, 1998 ) in a session separate from the pIAT and forecasting tasks.
The internal motivation to control prejudice scale (IMS) served as the index of beliefs about personal values. It taps the extent to which individuals consider nonprejudiced responding to be integral to their self-concept (Plant, 2004) . Participants rated the five scale items (e.g., "I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people because it is personally important to me.") using 9-point fully labeled scales with endpoints strongly disagree (-4) and strongly agree (4; ␣ ϭ .86; M ϭ 2.29, SD ϭ 1.60).
2
The external motivation to control prejudice scale (EMS) was a covariate. It taps the extent to which individuals consider nonprejudiced responding desirable for the sake of avoiding punishment from others who hold nonprejudiced values (Plant, 2004) . Participants rated the five scale items (e.g., "I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people in order to avoid disapproval from others.") using the same 9-point scales as for the IMS (␣ ϭ .89; M ϭ 0.37, SD ϭ 2.13).
Perspective manipulation and forecast measure. Participants completed an online imagination task that involved the perspective manipulation and checks from Experiment 1. This time, however, participants imagined themselves taking part in interactive activities with a partner whose physical characteristics were provided, 2 IMS and pIAT were correlated (r ϭ .21, p Ͻ .05). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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allegedly to facilitate visualization. The partner was described as the same gender as the participant; of average age, weight, and height; with brown hair and eyes; and African American. Participants received detailed descriptions of three activities: taking one another's pulses, playing the game Twister, and practicing a secret handshake. Participants pictured these interactions from the specified perspective and then used 7-point scales to rate the extent to which they would experience each of nine feelings if actually taking part in the imagined interactions. Five feelings indexed anxiety (nervous, comfortable, relaxed, anxious, uneasy) ; the rest were fillers (enthusiastic, happy, cheerful, intimidated) .
3 Anxiety items were scored so that higher numbers indicated greater anxiety and then were averaged (␣ ϭ .87).
Results
Linear regression predicted participants' forecasted anxiety from pIAT scores and explicit personal values (IMS; samplemean-centered), as well as perspective (-1 ϭ first-person, 1 ϭ third-person) and its interactions with the other two measures. EMS (sample-mean-centered) and its interaction with perspective were included as covariates (Yzerbyt, Muller, & Judd, 2004) . The covariate, EMS, was positively associated with forecasted anxiety (b ϭ 0.17, ␤ ϭ .28, t(82) ϭ 2.84, p Ͻ .01), consistent with previous work (Plant, 2004) , and perspective did not moderate that effect (b ϭ Ϫ0.03, ␤ ϭ -.05, t(82) ϭ 0.51).
General Discussion
Varying the visual perspective that people use to mentally simulate an event has opposite effects on the extent to which they rely on two distinct forms of self-knowledge. Picturing events from the first-person as opposed to third-person perspective causes people to rely more on associative evaluations of the simulated environment and less on propositional beliefs about personal preferences and values. Thus, when mental simulations involve imagery, the visual perspective of that imagery serves a function in guiding cognition. These findings have both theoretical and practical implications.
The Function of First-Person Imagery
People do not always incorporate associative evaluations into their explicit judgments (e.g., McConnell et al., 2011; Nosek, 2005) . Gaining insight into one's own associative evaluations can be challenging because this experiential facet of the self can operate outside of awareness, and competing propositional beliefs about one's own values and preferences can interfere (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2012; Hofmann & Wilson, 2010) . Previous research has identified strategies that facilitate reliance on associa-3 The interactive effects of perspective with pIAT and with explicit values were significantly different for anxiety and for filler items (Fs Ͼ 4.00, ps Ͻ .05). For filler items the effects predicted and found for anxiety did not emerge (|t|s Ͻ 1.30, ps Ͼ .21). This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
tive evaluations as events unfold in real time-for example, engaging in mindfulness meditation, which focuses attention on immediate experience without elaboration (e.g., Koole et al., 2009) , or focusing on how choice alternatives make one feel rather than on the reasons for those feelings (Gawronski & LeBel, 2008; Wilson et al., 1993) . These manipulations are conceptually similar to the effect that we propose that the first-person perspective has, facilitating reliance on associative reactions and reducing reliance on abstract beliefs.
The present experiments make a unique contribution by demonstrating that it is not necessary to actually experience events in order to gain insight into one's associative evaluations; people can do so simply by simulating events from the first-person perspective. Thus, contrary to some accounts (e.g., McConnell et al., 2011) , people are in fact able to draw on this influence when making forecasts, and first-person imagery facilitates doing so. Further, given the mental health benefits of cultivating experiential awareness while letting go of an abstract sense of self (Farb, Anderson, & Segal, 2012) , guided imagery techniques intended to enhance well-being (Hackmann, Bennett-Levy, & Holmes, 2011) may be most powerful when practiced using a first-person perspective.
The Function of Third-Person Imagery
Previous research has demonstrated that mentally simulating events from the third-person as opposed to first-person perspective facilitates reliance on propositional beliefs about the self's traits and developmental trajectories (Libby et al., 2005 . The present research demonstrates that third-person imagery facilitates reliance on propositional beliefs about the self's preferences and values. Thus, the present findings provide converging evidence that when picturing personal events, the third-person perspective facilitates understanding those events in terms of propositional beliefs that define personal identity . At the same time, the third-person perspective reduces reliance on associative evaluations of the simulated environment.
Given that mental simulation can provide a basis for guiding present behavior (e.g., Taylor et al., 1998) , the present findings suggest that third-person imagery may be useful in helping people follow through with value-consistent behavior. Indeed, relative to using the first-person perspective, picturing voting from the thirdperson perspective can promote actual voting (Libby et al., 2007) , and picturing an intergroup interaction from the third-person perspective can enhance interest in intergroup contact (Crisp & Husnu, 2011) . In addition to elucidating a potential mechanism for such effects, the present findings suggest potential moderators. Previously documented cases in which third-person imagery promotes simulated behavior should depend on individuals' holding explicit personal values that align with that behavior. And thirdperson imagery may be especially useful in domains where people are at risk of self-control failure, because such instances involve losing sight of abstract values in the face of concrete temptations (Fujita & Carnevale, 2012) .
Pathways by Which Mental Simulation Operates
Mental simulation of personal action and events supports a wide range of human capacities, and imagery is a common component of these simulations. The present experiments suggest that when people mentally simulate an event with first-person as opposed to third-person imagery they rely more on the associative evaluations evoked by features of the simulated environment and less on relevant propositional self-beliefs. Differential reliance on these two forms of self-knowledge can greatly influence cognition, emotion, and behavior (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011) . Thus, the present experiments offer insight into how a common, and easily manipulated, feature of mental simulation can influence the pathway by which that simulation informs thoughts, feelings, and actions in the present.
